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STA TEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a conditional plea under I.C.R. 11. The state alleged that the

defendant had driven under the influence. The defendant moved to suppress the results of a
breath test on the basis of a violation of the constitution's prohibition on warrantless searches,
but the Magistrate Court found that the defendant's consent, provided afier being told the
consequences of a refusal, was not invalid. The defendant then moved for the breath test result to
be excluded at trial because the state was in violation ofI.C. § 18-8004(4). At a later hearing, the
Court found that the Standard Operating Procedures were reliable. The Court also found there
was nothing wrong with the way the standards were adopted.
The defendant then entered a conditional plea of guilty while reserving his right to appeal
the Com1's rulings and the Court found his guilty. The defendant now appeals the judgment.
On February 7, 2014, the parties appeared telephonically before the Honorable John
Stegner in the District Court of the First District. Afier hearing argument, the district court
issued a Memorandum Opinion on March 7, 2014, affirming the judgment. The defendant now
appeals from the findings and order of the District Court.
B.

Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts
Coeur d'Alene Police Officer Rios stopped the defendant Jesse Riendeau as he walked

from his driveway to his front door on May 10, 2013. Tr. p. 5, L. 20-25, p. 32, L. 1-4. Later that
evening the officer arrested the defendant and cited him with driving under the influence. Tr. p.
23, L. 7-10.
- 1-

On May 10, 2013, the defendant appeared before the Magistrate Court and moved to
suppress the officer's stop of his person, the results of a breath test, and to exclude the results of
the breath test on the grounds that the foundation for their admission was in violation of LC. §§
18-8004(4) and 18-8002A. Tr. p. 1, L. 1-20. The Court heard Officer Rios testify. Tr. p. 5. The
parties stipulated to three videos which were entered as state's exhibits 1, 2, and 3. The
defendant entered the ALS fo1m the officer read to the defendant as defendant's exhibit A.
Exhibit 3 shows at the 0:00 minute mark the officer's original contact with the defendant, asking
him in an accusatory tone if he knows why he is being contacted, whether he's had anything to
drink, and then requests the defendant's license, which he is promptly given, as the officer
continues to talk to the defendant about driving in the bike lane.
The Court heard argument as to whether a waffant was required to do a breath test and
whether the consent provided after hearing the ALS form was valid. The Court found:
THE COURT: ..I'm not reading the McNeeley decision as being expanded to um, a
requirement that a person um, you know, uh, if he's refusing a breath test that they would
you know, I don't think the officer can force the person to blow into the machine. Um,
and if they want a blood test or blood, draw, then they're gonna have to get a search
wan-ant if the person doesn't consent to that, and I'm not sure that the implied consent
law is gonna be sufficient to provide that.
Now, what I'm getting here is uh, uh, from - ifl'm understanding Mr. Logsdon correctly,
he's feeling that the reading of the notice of the advisory form, Defendant's A, is kind of
almost forcing or coercing a person to take a breath test And I'm disagreeing with that. I
don't think that's what the law says and I'm not sayin' that's what the facts say here. It
-2-

appears to me that Mr. Riendeau has a decision to make. He can blow in the device or
not. IT's completely up to him. But if he doesn't, then there are going to be some
potential penalties. He does have the ability to request a hearing and show cause why he
didn't take the test.
Tr. p. 52, L. 12-23.
On May 20, 2013, the Court heard testimony from Jeremy Johnston of the Idaho State
Lab. Tr. p. 63.
On May 24, 2013, the Court heard argument on the Motion in Limine and the Motion to
Suppress the stop. Tr. p. 85. The Court found that the standard operating procedures adopted by
the Idaho State Police were "legitimate and make sure that the device is working properly and
assure us the scientific validity of the instrument." Tr. p. 103, L. 2-5.
The defendant entered a conditional plea under I.C.R. 11. The defendant timely filed a
notice of appeal under I.C.R. 54.1 (a), et.seq. from the judgment of the Court.
On February 7, 2014, the parties appeared telephonically before the Honorable John
Stegner of the District Court to argue the defendant's appeal. On March 7, 2014, the District
Court issued a Memorandum Opinion upholding the conviction. The Court specifically found
that the Court of Appeals ruling in Besaw was controlling on the issue of the reliability and
existence of a method for administering breath testing. The Court also appeared to rely on the
Comi of Appeals opinion in Alford, which held that the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act does
not apply when the Idaho State Police approves the methods for determining alcohol
concentration, despite that case having focused on the adoption of a particular testing device, and
not the rules for how a test is administered. The Court further found that the defendant's consent

-3-

was not invalid and analyzed the consent as a waiver of a constitutional right, concluding here
that in spite of ~McNeely, the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Neville was still good law
and controlled. On that basis, the Comi upheld the denial of the Motion to Suppress.
The defendant timely appealed from the District Comi' s findings and orders.
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ISSUES ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the Idaho State Police have properly promulgated rules for the
administration of breath testing.

11.

Whether the Idaho State Police have promulgated rules that ensure accuracy as
required by LC. § 18-8002A and LC. § 18-8004(4).

III.

Whether State v. Besaw, 306 P.3d. 219 (Idaho Ct.App.2013), is manifestly wrong
and should be oveITuled.

IV.

Whether the Administrative License Suspension advisory coerces and invalidates
the defendant's consent to providing a breath sample under the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution and Article I § 17 of the Idaho Constitution.

-5-

ARGUMENT

I.
A.

Introduction
The Magistrate Comi ened in not finding that a violation ofI.C. § 18-8004(4) would

prevent the admission of breath test results because the statute requires that a method exist that
ensures an extremely reliable result for the testing of breath for alcohol. The District Court
simply relied on the ruling in Besmv. This Court should either overrule Besaw or find it is not
controlling on the issues raised herein.
B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Idaho v. Button, 134

Idaho 814 (Ct.App.2000); Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 125 (Ct. App. 1997).
C.

LC. § 18-8004(4) requires the Idaho State Police to create a method for breath testing and
without a method ensuring extremely reliable results the results are not admissible.
LC. § 18-8004(4) states:
For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be
based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred ( 100) cubic
centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven (67)
milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of
determining the alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated
by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho state police
under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by that
department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of comi, the results of any test
for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by
the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police
shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for
examination.

This statute must be strictly construed. As the Idaho Supreme Court in Sivak wrote:
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Ordinarily, we must construe a statute to give effect to all of its parts, if we can,
and not construe it in a way that makes mere surplusage of one of its provisions.
However, there is another principle of statutory construction that must be
considered here. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed. In Thompson, the
Court said: "This principle extends not only to the elements of the substantive
crime, but also to the sanctions potentially involved."

Stale v. Sivak, 119 Idaho 320, 324-25 (1990); citing State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 29, 153
(1989); Hartley v. Miller-Stephan, 107 Idaho 688, 690 (1984) (overruled on other grounds,

Archer v. Bonners Feny Datsun, 117 Idaho 166 (1990)); State v. Thompson, 101 Idaho 430,437
(1980); State v. Alkire, 79 Idaho 334,338 (1957). Even if the result could be considered absurd,
Idaho statutory construction no longer considers absurdity of the result a ground for voiding or
changing a statute. Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Regional Med. Center, 151 Idaho 889,895 (2011).
The strict construction rule is the rigid foundation of the rule of law. As the Supreme Court of
the United States found:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be
subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a
government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled [sic] if it fails
to observe the law scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare
that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means * * *
would bring terrible retribution. Against that pernicious doctrine this court should
resolutely set its face.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-80 (1967) quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438,485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).

I. C. § 18-8004(4) unambiguously provides that the Idaho State Police shall create a
method for the analysis of breath and that the results of breath testing and that method will be
admissible despite any other law or court rule. The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously
-7-

considered what the result should be if the method is not faithfully complied with in State v. Bell,
115 Idaho 36 (Ct.App.1988) and its progeny. The Court in Bell held:
The pertinent language of LC. § 18-8004(4), in effect at the time, stated:
Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining the alcohol
concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho
department of health and welfare or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho
department of health and welfare under the provisions of approval and
certification standards to be set by that department, .... [Emphasis added.] FN 3
FN3. "Analysis" as used in the quoted language ofl.C. § 18-8004(4) refers only
to that part of the testing procedure which must be performed in an approved
laboratory. However, a critical part of the "analysis," in a broader sense, is the
first step of collecting a sample for testing. The collection of blood, urine or
breath samples obviously will not generally be made at an approved laboratory.
Nevertheless, because collection of samples is an essential part of analysis,
Department of Health and Welfare regulations extend to that activity and, for the
collection of blood, include descriptions of the proper collection instruments,
antiseptics and chemical additives for preserving the sample in optimum condition
for testing.
The question then is whether, in the absence of an express exclusionary provision,
this language nevertheless requires exclusion of a test result where compliance
with the Health and Welfare testing requirements is not shown.
The admissibility of the result of a scientific test such as the blood-alcohol test in
LC. § 18-8004 turns normally on a foundation which establishes the acceptability,
validity, reliability and accuracy of the test and test procedures. In the admission
of a test result for alcohol concentration the Legislature has concluded that certain
foundational elements need not be presented at trial unless such elements are
disputed. The Legislature has acknowledged that ce1iain tests, due to a histo1y of
reliability and accuracy, are presumed to be valid and acceptable. This has also
been acknowledged by the courts. See State v. Hartwig, 112 Idaho 370
(Ct.App.1987) (holding that Intoximeter 3000 test result may be offered into
evidence without detailed foundation, but reliability of result may be challenged
by defendant).
The Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme which allows an expedient method
for admitting a blood-alcohol test result into evidence without the need for some
expert testimony. As provided by I.C. § 18-8004(4):
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test
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for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval,
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by
the Idaho department of health and welfare or by any other method approved by
health and welfare shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the
necessity of producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure
for examination.
When this proposed statute was presented to the Legislature the statement of
purpose accompanying the legislation explained that expe1i witness testimony was
an unnecessary burden on the state. Such testimony, if used merely to establish a
foundation, provided superfluous verification of a test procedure which the
Legislature believed to produce an "extremely reliable" result.
Inherent in this statutory scheme, however, is an awareness by the Legislature of
the need for uniform test procedures. An "extremely reliable" test result can only
be the product of a test procedure which from previous use is known to be capable
of producing an accurate result. This benefit is best provided by strict adherence to
a uniform procedure. This was recognized by the Legislature and is apparent first,
from the statutory language which provides for the test procedure to be
determined by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and second, by the
"shall" language mandating adherence to the standards set by that Department.
The acceptance by the Legislature of test procedures as designated by the Idaho
Department of Health and Welfare does not wholly eliminate the need of
establishing foundational requirements for a test result. This is required even in
light of the legislative directive to utilize an expedient means to admit such
evidence. The adoption of the pmiicular test procedure merely recognizes the
validity and reliability of that particular accepted test. It must still be established at
trial that those procedures which ensure the reliability and in turn the accuracy of
the test have been met. Absent such a showing, the expedient scheme adopted by
the Legislature fails to guarantee the admission of reliable evidence. Without
expe1i witness testimony to establish these necessm-y foundational elements,
compliance with the test procedure must be shown. We hold that to admit the test
result the state must provide adequate foundation evidence consisting either of
expert testimony or a showing that the test was administered in conformity with
the applicable test procedure. Of course, a test result, once admitted, still may be
attacked by the defendant. In that event, the trier of fact will determine the
ultimate weight to be given the test result.

Id. at 37-40. The District Court in this case seemingly broadened this holding to include the
current situation where no method exists. However, the Court in Bell was quite clear in finding
that the legislature had mandated that a method be created for breath testing. When the Idaho
-9-

State Police choose to violate this directive, it is clear that no breath test results will be
admissible. The lack of a uniform method creates a situation where the breath test results are
unreliable, just as the existence of such a method shields that method from criticism because its
constant, rigid application maintains its credibility.
The Court of Appeals recently ruled in State v. Besaw, 306 P.3d. 219 (Idaho
Ct.App.2013) that LC.§ 18-8004(4) merely required that the method be "capable" of producing
an accurate result. The Court's ruling is in error, both in that it overruled Bell without employing
the proper test, and in that it misinterprets the legislature's requirements for the executive.
Fundamentally, no expert, however well trained, can ensure the reliability of a breath test result done
without a method. The rule oflaw cannot ignore the Rules of Scientific Procedure. The laissez faire
approach currently adopted by the Idaho State Police cannot ensure reliability to a standard necessary
for LC.§ 18-8004(4) or the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution's due process
protections. Simply allowing the Idaho State Police to be the testing agency should be, in and of
itself, reason to find that the results are unusable. This Court should find that the findings in Besaw
were in error and overrule that case.
Further, this Court should find that the SOPs have been modified so that the word "must" has
been replaced by the word "should" in the following instances:
I. The necessity to have the correct acceptable range limits and performance verification
standard lot number set in the instrument prior to evidentiary testing- 2.2.11 (1/15/2009) cf.
5.2.10 (1/16/2013).
2. The need to monitor the subject for fifteen minutes prior to the test to ensure there is no
alcohol being regurgitated or in the mouth. See 3.1, 3.1.5, 3.1.5.1, 3.1.5.2 (1/15/2009) cf. 6.1,
6.1.4, 6.1.4.1, 6.1.4.2 (1/16/2013).
These changes occurred between the April 23, 2012 version of the SOPs and the installment current
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at the time of the incident in the above-entitled matter.
Mouth alcohol is an enormous issue with breath testing. See Caddy, Sobell, and Sobell,
Alcohol Breath Tests: Criterion Times for Avoiding Contamination by 'Mouth Alcohol', 10(6)
BEHAVIOR RESEARCH METHODS AND INSTRUMENTATION 814-18 (1978); Breath-Alchohol
Concentration May Not Always Reflect the Concentration of Alcohol in Blood, 18 J.
ANALYTlCAL TOXICOLOGY 225 (July/Aug. 1994); Colorado Department of Health, 6(11)
Drinking/Driving L. Letter 5 (May 29, 1987); Kechagias, Jonsson, Franzen, Andersson & Jones,
Reliability of Breath-Alcohol Analysis in Individuals with Gastroesophageal Reflux Disease,
44( 4) J. FORENSIC Scis. 814 (1999); Gaylard, Sambuk & Morgan, Reductions in Breath Ethanol
Readings in Normal Male Volunteers Following Mouth Rinsing with Water at Differing
Temperatures, 22 ALCOHOL & ALCOHOLISM 113 (1987); P. Price, Intoxilyzer: A Bread Testing
Device?, 15(4) Drinking/Driving L. Letter 52 (1996) (slope detector failures); Ethanol Content of
Various Foods and Soft Drinks and their Potential for Interference with a Breath-Alcohol Test,
22 J. ANALYTICAL TOXICOLOGY 181 (May/June 1998); Michael P. Hlastala, Ph.D., Wayne J.E.
Lamm, M.A. and James Nesci, J.D., The Slope Detector Does Not Always Detect the Presence of
Mouth Alcohol, THE CHAMPION, (National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers), 57-60
(March 2006).
This Court should find that the removal of this requirement renders the SOPs incapable of
ensuring accuracy.
D.

This Comi should decide that no method exists.
Idaho Code 18-8004(4) mandates that testing for alcohol concentration be done in

accordance with methods approved by the Idaho State Police. In supposed compliance with that
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mandate and authority, the Idaho State Police has issued both "Standard Operating Procedures:
Breath Alcohol Testing," ("SOP" or "SOPs") (available at
http://www.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/index.html) which purports to establish procedures for the
maintenance and operation of breath testing equipment as well as training and operations
manuals ("manual" or "manuals") (also available at
http://vvww.isp.idaho.gov/forensics/index.html) for the various breath testing devices, including
the Intoxilyzer 5000 device used in this case.
The ISP, by using SOPs in the place ofregulations, has made an end-run around the
requirements of the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act, specifically LC. §§ 67-5220 - 67-5232
and I.D.A.P.A. 44.01. The ISP promulgated 11.03.01.014.03, which merely states that breath
tests shall be in conformity with standards established by the ISP. Thus, the various changes the
ISP makes to its breath testing procedures receive no public scrutiny prior to implementation,
which files in the face of what the legislature had in mind in passing LC. § 18-8004(4). Under
the statutory definition, an agency action is a rule if it ( 1) is a statement of general applicability
and (2) implements, interprets, or prescribes existing law. See Tomorrovv's Hope, Inc. v. Idaho
Department ofHealth and Welfare, 124 Idaho 843, 846 (1993). The Idaho Supreme Court

considers the following characteristics of agency action indicative of a rule: (1) wide coverage,
(2) applied generally and uniformly, (3) operates only in future cases, (4) prescribes a legal
standard or directive not otherwise provided by the enabling statute, (5) expresses agency policy
not previously expressed, and (6) is an interpretation of law or general policy. Asarco
Incorporated v. State, 138 Idaho 719, 723 (2003). The standard operating procedures for

breathalyzer testing promulgated by the Idaho State Police easily fits this definition of a rule.
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A comparison of the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis in Asarco with LC. § 18-8004(4)
and the Idaho State Police's Standard Operating Procedures shows that the SOPs are rules that
fall under the IAP A.

1. The TMDL has wide coverage. The TMDL applies to all cun-ent and future
dischargers in a specific water body, in this case, the Coeur d'Alene River Basin.
Thus, the TMDL is accurately described by the trial court as applying to "a large
segment of the general public rather than an individual or narrow select group."
Asarco, 138 Idaho at 723. In this case, the SOPs apply to all breath testing that takes
place in the state of Idaho and thus to the entire driving population in the state. The scope
of the SOPs easily meets this requirement.

2. The TMDL is applied generally and uniformly. While the TMDL has
characteristics that are both generally applicable and discharger specific, the
TMDL, on the whole, is more appropriately described as generally applicable.
The TMDL, in part, constitutes a numerical limit or budget for a given water
body, based on the sum of the allowable pollution from all identified point source
and nonpoint sources of pollution, as well as natural background levels of the
pollutant. LC. § 39-3602(27); 40 CFR 130.2(i). These sums are based on
individual determinations, referred to as load allocations (LA's) and wasteload
allocations (WLA's). LA's are defined as the "portion of a receiving water's
loading capacity that is attributed either to one of its existing or future nonpoint
sources of pollution or to natural background sources." 40 CFR 130.2(g). The
wasteload allocations (WLA's) represent the "portion of a receiving water's
loading capacity that is allocated to one of its existing or future point sources of
pollution." 40 CFR l 30.2(h). The federal regulations further describe the WLA's
as "a type of water-quality based effluent limitation." Id. In addition, the EPA has
used these individualized load allocations as enforceable limits modifying the
Mining Companies' NPDES permits accordingly. Thus, focusing on the LA and
WLA determinations alone, the TMDL process appears to be discharger specific.
Nevertheless, the individual LA and WLA determinations are just a small part of
the entire TMDL process. First, the TMDL considers the LA and WLA allocations
in sum in order to determine an over-all effluent limitation budget for the
identified water body. This budget applies to all existing and future point and
nonpoint source dischargers in a general and uniform manner. Second, the TMDL
process outlined by Idaho statute includes the following additional qualitative and
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quantitative determinations:
(1) Identification of pollutants impacting the water body;
(2) An inventory of all point and nonpoint sources of the identified pollutant ... ;
(3) An analysis of why current control strategies are not effective in assuring full
support of designated beneficial uses;
(4) A plan to monitor and evaluate progress toward water quality progress and to
ascertain when designated beneficial uses will be fully supported;
(5) Pollution control strategies for both nonpoint and point sources for reducing
those sources of pollution;
(6) Identification of the period of time necessary to achieve full support of
designated beneficial uses; and
(7) An adequate margin of safety to account for uncertainty.
LC. § 39-3611. Clearly these procedures are generally and uniformly applicable
and require DEQ to focus on the waterbody as a whole, as opposed to the
individual sources of pollution. Therefore, for the above reasons, even though the
TMDL involves determinations of specific applicability, the over-all scheme
demonstrates the TMDL is more appropriately described as generally and
unifonnly applicable.

Id. at 723-34. The method required by LC. § 18-8004(4) is intended by the legislature to act as
gatekeeper for the introduction of breath test results in DUI cases. LC.§ 18-8004(4) explicitly
requires courts to allow the introduction of the breath test results as long as the method is
followed in spite of the rules of evidence. The procedures are meant to be "generally and
uniformly applicable" so as to guarantee accuracy. See Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation

Department, 148 Idaho 3 78, 3 87 (2009) (Wheeler, J. dissenting) citing Statement of Purpose, HB
284 (RS 13389) ( 1987).
3. The TMDL Operates Only in Future Cases. The TMDL operates only
prospectively and does not adjudicate past actions by the Mining Companies or
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any other party.

Id. at 724. The method that the Idaho State Police must adopt is not retroactive.
4. The TMDL Prescribes a Legal Standard Not Provided by the Enabling Statute.
As described above, the TMDL constitutes a numerical limit on the total
allowable discharge in a specified waterbody. This limit is allocated between
point sources and nonpoint sources of pollution. Even if DEQ does not intend to
enforce these limitations, and this Court is not determining whether or not it may
properly do so, EPA considers these numbers binding and has already used the
TMDL in order to reduce the discharge limits reflected in several of the Mining
Companies' NPDES permits. Thus, the TMDL in fact contains quantitative legal
standards not provided by either the Clean Water Act or the Idaho Water Quality
Act.

Id. The legislature requires the Idaho State Police to define a method. I.C. § 18-8004(4). That
method creates a legal standard preventing the Court from requiring the state to provide an expert
to establish a reliable and accurate breath test. Id. Therefore, the method is a legal standard not
provided by LC.§ 18-8004(4).
5. The TMDL Expresses New Agency Policy. Even if the TMDL is nothing more
than a planning tool, as DEQ argues, it is an expression of agency policy not
previously addressed. This is true not only of the numerical limits contained in the
TMDL, but also the additional requirements contained in the Idaho Water Quality
Act, including (1) the analysis of why current control strategies are not effective in
assuring full support of designated beneficial uses; (2) the plan to monitor and
evaluate progress toward water quality progress and to ascertain when designated
beneficial uses will be fully suppo1ied; and (3) the identification of pollution
control strategies for both nonpoint and point sources for reducing those sources
of pollution. I.C. § 39-3611.

Id. at 724-25. The method adopted by the Idaho State Police in its Standard Operating
Procedures is policy inasmuch as it establishes requirements, parameters, and guidance for police
officers performing breath testing.
6. The TMDL Implements and Interprets Existing Law. While DEQ argues the
TMDL implements the water quality standards, which constitute a rule as opposed
to a law, the TMDL actually implements and interprets the directives contained in
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both the Clean Water Act, as well as the more specific Idaho Water Quality Act.
The central problem with DEQ's argument is the state water quality standards do
not provide all of the information or direction necessary for promulgating a
TMDL. While the water quality standards serve as a basis for the TMDL
calculations, the TMDL requires much more. Under the Idaho Water Quality Act,
not only must DEQ identify the pollutants and inventory point and nonpoint
sources of pollution, the agency must also analyze why cunent control strategies
are not effective and develop new pollution control strategies for point and
nonpoint sources of pollution. LC.§ 39-3611. In addition, the Idaho Water
Quality Act requires DEQ to allocate effluent limitations among point and
nonpoint sources of pollution and develop planning processes to monitor and
evaluate progress. Id In making these types of decisions, DEQ is working far
outside the scope of the water quality standards alone and is both implementing
law and creating policy. Thus, DEQ's argument that the TMDL implements a rule
as opposed to a law is unpersuasive.

Id Unlike in Asarco, there is no colorable argument that the Idaho State Police are not
implementing and interpreting LC.§ 18-8004(4). The legislature required the ISP to adopt a
method that would act as a guarantor of admissibility in a criminal trial, and the ISP has
acknowledged that the SOPs are its attempt to do so. See IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03.
Further, the Court of Appeals acknowledged in Wanner v. State Dept. ofTransp., 150
Idaho 164 (2011), that hearings held per LC.§ 18-8002A are agency action controlled by
IDAP A. It is difficult to understand how the hearings provided are agency action but the
methods and rules required are not agency action falling under the requirements of IDAP A.
Therefore, this Court must come to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court in Asarco:
In conclusion, the district court correctly determined the establishment of the
TMDL involved "rulemaking." Furthermore, because the TMDL is properly
considered a rule, it is invalid pursuant to the IAP A.
The IAP A provides, "[a] temporary or final rule adopted and becoming effective
after July 1, 1993, is voidable unless adopted in substantial compliance with the
requirements of this chapter." LC. § 67-5231. It is undisputed that DEQ did not
comply with formal rulemaking requirements. Rather than arguing it had
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substantially complied with the rulemaking requirements, DEQ argued it did not
have to do so. Thus, the district court correctly held the TMDL is void for failure
to comply with state administrative law.

Asarco, 138 Idaho at 725. The ISP has also never coplied with formal rulemaking requirements
for the issuance and changes to its SOPs. Thus, the ISP's SOPs are legally void. As such, no
method exists and the ISP has failed to comply with the legislature's requirements under LC. §
18-8004(4). Though the Court of Appeals has held that where the method is not complied with
an expert may be called to establish reliability, where no method exists at all, reliability cannot be
established. State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 737 (Ct.App.2011). This is both because the
legislature has fixed the admissibility requirements for breath tests and made them conditional on
the existence of a method, and because the Court cannot find reliability exists where the agency
responsible for establishing a method refuses to do so, ostensibly to take advantage of the fact
that few defendants can afford an expert and the ISP's expert will be able to convince any court
to introduce the breath test results.
The above is compounded by the fact that the very agency that investigates and charges
crimes is placed in charge of ensuring scientific reliability. This "fox watching the henhouse"
scenario should further compel this Court to find that the method for breath testing requires
public hearings before rules are promulgated or changed.
The District Court and Magistrate Court improperly found that Besaw already controlled
the outcome and had found that the rules either do exist or that regardless of their existence the
results of the breath test would not be excluded. On the contrary, even under Besaw, a total lack
of rules would necessarily mean that the method cannot ensure a reliable result, and thus, both
courts erred in denying the request to exclude the result.
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The District Court also appears to rely on the ruling in State v. Alford, 139 Idaho 595, 597
(Ct.App.2004) that selecting a breath testing device was not a rule to uphold the Magistrate's
denial. This ruling fundamentally misunderstands Alford. The Court in Alford was merely ruling
on the approval of the Alco-Sensor III for breath testing. The opinion never addresses, much less
decides, the issue of the Standard Operating Procedures promulgated by the Idaho State Police
for purposes of the method of doing a breath test.
The Court in Alford found:
The DUI statute already prescribes the legal standard limiting an individual's
alcohol concentration. Alford has failed to demonstrate that any Idaho state police
policy was expressed, or that any law or policy was interpreted, by the approval of
the Alco-Sensor III. Instead, the Idaho state police properly carried out a statutory
duty to authorize the use of certain breath-testing equipment by law enforcement
agencies. In doing so, it identified equipment that it found to be suitable for such
purpose. It did not create additional legal requirements. Thus, the state was not
required to provide evidence of Idaho state police compliance with IAP A in
approving the use of the Alco-Sensor III.

Alford, 139 Idaho at 598. The finding is correct: authorizing the use of a particular piece of
equipment is not policy. However, the procedure for the use of that device is rulemaking. To
pretend that it is not strains the word "rule" to the breaking point. This Court cannot claim in the
same breath that the police are required to follow certain procedures using the word "must"
because ofl.C. § 18-8004(4) and then deny that those procedures are rules interpreting and
implementing the law. See Wheeler, 148 Idaho at 384.
Counsel for the defendant is, frankly, puzzled by the emphasis placed on the dissent in

Wheeler by the District Court. Counsel for the defense does not agree with the dissent in
Wheeler. Counsel points this Court to the majority opinion in Wheeler:
The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which we exercise free
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review. Zener v. Velde, 135 Idaho 352, 355 (Ct.App.2000). Administrative
regulations are subject to the same principles of statutory construction as statutes.
Mason v. Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 586 (2001). When interpreting a statute
or rule, we will construe the statute as a whole to give effect to the intent of the
legislature or promulgating entity. See George W Watkins Family v. Messenger,
118 Idaho 537, 539-40 (1990); Zener, 135 Idaho at 355. Interpretation of such a
rule should begin, therefore, with an examination of the literal words of the rule.
Mason, 135 Idaho at 586, 21 P.3d at 908. The language of the rule, like the
language of a statute, should be given its plain, obvious and rational meaning. Id.
In addition, this language should be construed in the context of the rule and statute
as a whole, to give effect to the rule and to the statutory language the rule is meant
to supplement. Id. When an ambiguous rule is part of a larger scheme, we focus
not only upon the language of the ambiguous rule, but also look at other rules
relating to the same subject matter and consider them together to discern the
promulgator's intent. See State v. Shanks, 139 Idaho 152, 154 (Ct.App.2003).
In this case, we must interpret the meaning of the SOP directing that the
calibration solution should be changed approximately every 100 checks or every
month, whichever is sooner. The hearing officer and the district court agreed that
the word "should" was not mandatory and that deviation from the standard did not
automatically render the test result inadmissible. Wheeler argues that the word
"should" is mandatory and that any deviation results in a per se invalidation of the
test. However, this reading of the regulation is not in harmony with its plain
language. Furthermore, even if the language was ambiguous, such a reading is not
in harmony with the intent of the promulgating party nor with the surrounding
rules of similar subject matter read together as part of a larger regulatory scheme.
148 Idaho at 384. The majority analyzed the SOPs as rules. The majority ruled that the word
"should" is to be interpreted as a recommendation, whereas the words "shall" or "must" make a
rule mandatory. The dissent in Wheeler disagreed as to the implication of the word "should," and
further found that the majority's holding meant there were no requirements. Id. at 389-90. The
dissent's argument as to the impo1iance of having a method that is mandatory in breath testing
was not related to the question presented in that case. Further, the dissent was wrong: the SOPs
consisted of shalls, musts, as well as shoulds. Nothing in the majority's ruling meant that there
was no method or that the state was not required to use a method that would produce an
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extremely reliable result. All the Wheeler majority held was that a particular rule was not
mandatory. Id. at 387. It was not until Besaw that the Court of Appeals determined that all the
state had to produce was a method that was capable of producing an accurate result. But even
that case did not hold that having no method at all was acceptable.
Counsel for the defense further submits that the District Court Judge has already
reconsidered and held that the SOPs are of no legal consequence and that no method exists as
required by LC.§ 18-8004(4). See attached State v. Nauer!, Kootenai County CR-13-10176 (1st
Dist.Ct. July 7, 2014) (Memorandum Opinion). The Court in Nauert properly held that the SOPs
are merely internet standards without the force and effect of law. Id. at * 10. Thus, they cannot
affect the Rules of Evidence. Id. The Court held that LC. § 18-8004(4), ifread to provide
plenary power to the executive to determine the admissibility of evidence, not only provides a
"legislative substitute for scientific reliability" but violates the separation of powers. Id. at *1415 citing IDAHO CONST. Art. III § 1, Art. II § 1 (other citations omitted). The defendant adopts
the District Court's legal analysis and findings in Nauert as part of his argument to this Court to
overturn the District Court's incorrect ruling in this matter.
This Court should hold that it is not acceptable for the state to shirk its legal
responsibilities or for the executive to control what evidence is admissible in a criminal trial,
particularly when that evidence amounts to prima facie evidence of guilt, and remand this case
with instructions to grant the defendant's Motion in Limine in this case.
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II.

A.

Introduction
The Magistrate Court ened in denying the defendant's motion to suppress his breath test

because a law providing for various penalties for relying on one's constitutional rights is invalid,
as is any consent provided after being warned of those penalties. The District Court further ened
in relying on Neville to affirm the Magistrate, which was necessarily overruled by the holding in

McNeely.
B.

Standard of Review
An appellate court exercises free review over questions of law. Button, 134 Idaho 814;

Powell, 130 Idaho at 125.
C. A valid consent cannot be produced after the Notice of Suspension for Failure of
Evidentiary Testing has been read to a citizen without the state first obtaining a warrant.
In Afissouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (U.S.Mo. 2013), the Supreme Court of the
United States held that an officer's belief that a person is cunently intoxicated and need to
conduct an evidentiary test before the alcohol in their system evaporates does not per se create
exigent circumstances that allow the officer to forego seeking a warrant.
The state ofidaho, like the other forty-nine states, has adopted what is called an implied
consent law. McNeely, supra, at 1566-67. In Idaho, implied consent means that a person who has
accepted the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways, provided that
evidentiary testing is administered by a peace officer with reasonable grounds for suspicion of
DUI, will physically consent to an evidentiary test. See State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 712
(Ct.App.2008); LC. § 18-8002(1 ). Implied consent is unrelated to and occurs after the wan-ant
required under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I § 17 of the
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Idaho Constitution. See State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 372-374 (1989). However, because it
was enoneously held by the Idaho Supreme Court that no wanant was required in a DUI case,
the warrant issue has long been overlooked. See id.
The relevant text of Woolery will be reproduced below:
As explained by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State v. Zielke, 137 Wis.2d 39,
403 N.W.2d 427 (1987), "the implied consent law is an important weapon in the
battle against drunk driving in this state. Neither the law, its history nor common
sense allows this court to countenance its use as a shield by the defense to prevent
constitutionally obtained evidence from being admitted at trial." 403 N.W.2d 427,
434.
The South Dakota Supreme Court ruling in State v. Buckingham, 240 N.W.2d 84
(1976), that noncompliance with the implied consent statutes rendered the blood
sample and test results inadmissible in a driving while intoxicated manslaughter
prosecution, was ovenuled just one year later in State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d
I 31 (S.D.1977). The court explained:
The Buckingham decision was without the benefit of argument from the state on
the question of whether use of the "exclusionary rule" was necessary where there
is a violation of the implied consent statutes. Upon further consideration, this
court feels that it is necessary to modify the Buckingham decision .... Our
consideration of the implied consent statutes must be prefaced upon the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber v. California [citations omitted in
quote] ... The exclusionary rule is a judicially created means of protecting the
rights of citizens under the Fourth Amendment and Art. VI,§ 11 of the South
Dakota Constitution as a deterrent to unlawful police conduct. However, evidence
obtained in violation of statutory rights is not inadmissible per se unless the
statutory rights are of constitutional proportions or there exists no other method of
detening future violations of the rights which the legislature has granted to its
citizens.

Hartman, 256 N. W.2d 131, 134-13 5. In holding that the results of the blood test
were admissible, the court explained that despite the fact the legislature created
a specific right of a driver to refuse to submit to a test to determine the
alcohol content of his blood, failure to comply with the procedure as set forth
in the implied consent statutes docs not require suppression of the test results
as long as the testing procedure complied with the driver's constitutional
rights. [emphasis added].
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The Idaho Legislature has acknowledged a driver's physical ability to refuse to
submit to an evidentiary test, but it did not create a statut01y right for a driver to
withdraw his previously given consent to an evidentiary test for concentration of
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances. [emphasis in original].
Importantly, the pre-1983 statute, LC. § 49-352, covering implied consent to
extract blood for a blood alcohol test, stated: "If such person having been placed
under arrest and having thereafter been requested to submit to such chemical test
refuses to submit to such chemical test the test shall not be given but the
department shall suspend his license or permit to drive .... " The 1984 legislature
repealed LC. § 49-352, the legislative precursor of§ 18-8002, and adopted § 188002 as a paii of the new chapter 80 of title 18. In addition to maintaining the pre1983 implied consent language and the 1983 deletion of the language just
discussed, this enactment added a section making it clear that a driver does not
have the right to consult with an attorney before submitting to an evidentiary test.
The state submits that the elimination of the statutory provision that the test shall
not be given if it is refused, the continued use of the pre-1983 implied consent
language, the addition of a specific statutory provision making it very clear that a
driver does not have a right to consult with an attorney before submitting to the
evidentiary test, along with the statement of purpose enacted as a paii of the 1983
Act, reflect the legislative "get tough" policy. This legislative "get tough" policy
did not include the creation of a statutory right for a driver to refuse to submit to
an evidentiary test requested by an officer who has reasonable cause to believe
that such driver is under the influence.
The Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Newton, 636 P.2d 393 (1981), explained
that the concept of implied consent is a statutory fiction which, at first, appears to
be theoretically contradictory[:]
The contradiction disappears, however, when it is realized that the words
"consent" and "refusal" are not used as antonyms, because they are not used in the
same sense. "Consent" describes a legal act; "refusal" describes a physical reality.
By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a licensed driver to lawfully
refuse, but it cannot remove his or her physical power to refuse. As another court
put it:
The obvious reason for acquiescence in the refusal of such a test by a person who
as a matter of law is "deemed to have given his consent" is to avoid the violence
which would often attend forcible tests upon recalcitrant inebriates.
It is firmly established that a drunken driver has no right to resist or refuse
such a test [citations omitted in quote]. [emphasis added]. It is simply because
such a person has the physical power to make the test impractical, and dangerous
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to himself and those charged with administering it, that it is excused upon an
indication of his unwillingness .... Bush v. Bright, 264 Cal.App.2d 788, 790, 792,
71 Cal.Rptr. 123 at 125 (1968) (original emphasis).
Thus refusal as contemplated by the statute is something other than withholding of
consent because consent is legally implied. It is a refusal to comply with the
consent which has already been given as a condition of a license to drive. The
purpose of a warning of license suspension following a refusal ... is to overcome
an unsanctioned refusal by threat instead of force. It is not to reinstate a right to
choice, but rather to nonforcibly enforce the driver's previous implied consent.
636 P.2d 393 at 397-398 (original emphasis). See also State v. Hoehne, 78
Or.App. 479, 717 P.2d 237 (1986); State v. Spencer, 305 Or. 59, 750 P.2d 147
(1988); Pears v. State, 672 P.2d 903 (Alaska App.1983), rev'd on other grounds,
698 P.2d 1198 (Alaska 1985); Wirz v. State, 577 P.2d 227 (Alaska 1978).
The Idaho Legislature has not created a statutory right to refuse to submit to an
evidentiary test to determine a driver's blood alcohol level. It is difficult to believe
that the Idaho Legislature would provide an individual with the statutory right to
prevent the state from obtaining highly relevant evidence when a law enforcement
officer has reasonable cause to believe that individual has committed a crimewhether it would be driving under the influence, vehicular manslaughter, sale of
controlled substances, or murder. If the driver's constitutional right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures is complied with, the state should
not be prevented from obtaining such relevant evidence as the alcohol
content of the driver's blood. [emphasis added].
To put it more succinctly, the Comi found that:
[i]n Schmerber,. the United States Supreme Comi recognized that a wan-antless
seizure of the blood of a driver, as long as probable cause exists and the
withdrawal of the blood is done in a reasonable fashion, does comply with the
provisions of the fourth amendment.

Id. at 374. However, the Idaho Supreme Court was manifestly wrong in its interpretation of
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) and has now been ovenuled by the United States
Supreme Cami's ruling in McNeely. See McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1558-59. Therefore, a
warrantless evidentiary test in a DUI case is presumptively unconstitutional, and a person does
have the right to refuse to do the test unless and until a warrant has been secured or an exception
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to the warrant requirement exists.
After Woolery, cases involving implied consent and the Fourth Amendment followed its
reasoning until Goerig v. State, 121 Idaho 26, 29 (Ct.App.1992) and State v. Nickerson, 132
Idaho 406 (Ct.App.1999). See State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009 (1990); State v. Burris, 125
Idaho 289 (Ct.App.1994); Matter of McNeely, 119 Idaho 182 (Ct.App.1990). The Idaho Court of
Appeals in Nickerson misinterpreted Woolery as follows:
Nickerson's argument that his consent to the BAC at the police station was
involuntary is of no consequence because he had impliedly consented as a matter
of law. One who drives a motor vehicle on Idaho's highways is statutorily deemed
to have consented to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol concentration. Idaho
Code § 18-8002( 1) provides that"[a ]ny person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent
to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol" if the test is administered at the
request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has
been driving under the influence of intoxicants. By terms of this statute, anyone
who accepts the privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways has
thereby consented in advance to submit to a BAC test. By implying consent, the
statute removes the right of a driver to refuse an evidentiary test. Hence, although
an individual has the physical ability to prevent a test, there is no legal right to
withdraw the statutorily implied consent.
132 Idaho at 410 citing Woolery, 116 Idaho at 372; Burris, 125 Idaho at 291; Goerig 121 Idaho at
29 (Ct.App.1992) ("By implying consent, the statute removes the right of a licensed driver to
refuse to take an evidentiary test; however, recognizing that some individuals may refuse to
comply with their previously given consent, the legislature provided an administrative process to
revoke those persons' licenses." citing Woolery, 116 Idaho at 373); McNeely, 119 Idaho at 187.
Nowhere in these opinions is there an explanation for how the Supreme Court in Woolery's
statement that no legal right exists to refuse an evidentiary test for alcohol in a DUI case and that
implied consent only dealt with the physical ability to refuse became confused for implied
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consent itself taking away the legal right to refuse and a person having the physical ability to
refuse. Once the mistake was made, however, the courts cited it repeatedly until at last the
Supreme Court held it to be true in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829 (2002). Indeed, the Supreme
Court of Idaho even cited to Nickerson as its only authority for the concept that implied consent
was consent to a Fourth Amendment search, sub silentio overruling its holding in Woolery. Id. at
833.
However, the Supreme Court's holding is manifestly wrong. The state does not have the
power to require consent to a search in violation of the Constitution to use the road. Woole1y, 116
Idaho at 372 quoting Hartman, 256 N.W.2d at 134-135. Certainly, it would be shocking that a
state legislature could do to drivers what it cannot do to prisoners. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517 (1984) ("We have repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the reach of the Constitution.
No 'iron curtain' separates one from the other."). Rather than simply state that those who choose
to live in general population rather than solitary impliedly consent to random shakedowns, the
Court has held that prison regulations that inhibit rights are reviewed for their reasonableness.

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1987). Once the Fourth Amendment was applied to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), one would imagine the states did not retain the
ability to simply force their citizens to give up its protections whenever they pleased. The
Comt's holding would allow the state to vary the protections of the federal Constitution in a
manner that hardly seems fitting to something titled "federal." As the federal Supreme Court
stated in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008) (footnote omitted) citing Atwater v. City of

Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), Payton v. Ne,v York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-584 (1980); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-627 (1886):
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We are aware of no historical indication that those who ratified the Fourth
Amendment understood it as a redundant guarantee of whatever limits on search
and seizure legislatures might have enacted. The immediate object of the Fourth
Amendment was to prohibit the general warrants and writs of assistance that
English judges had employed against the colonists. That suggests, if anything,
that founding-era citizens were skeptical of using the rules for search and seizure
set by government actors as the index of reasonableness.

Incorporating state-law arrest limitations into the Constitution would produce a
constitutional regime no less vague and unpredictable than the one we rejected in
Atwater. The constitutional standard would be only as easy to apply as the
underlying state law, and state law can be complicated indeed.
To the extent that the Supreme Court of Idaho has held that the state may force its citizens to
waive their federal constitutional rights to participate in something as universal as driving, it is
manifestly wrong. The Bill of Rights is a dead letter if the government it was designed to protect
its citizens from may simply waive it on a whim.

McNeely holds that it is not reasonable to search a driver's body for signs of intoxication
absent a wmTant or when an exception to the warrant requirement applies. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at
1558-59. Therefore, the Court has reviewed the reasonableness of the warrantless evidentiary
test in DUI cases and indicated that the Constitution requires more than probable cause and the
withdrawal of blood being done in a reasonable fashion. Cf Woolery, 116 Idaho at 374. The
Constitution requires a warrant.
Further, the state may not punish a citizen for exercising or standing on their
constitutional rights. Village of Willowbrook v. Ole ch, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000).
This Court must determine the validity of consent after a person has been read the Notice
of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing (otherwise known as the ALS form) as it was at
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the time of this incident. This form is read by Idaho police to defendants and states:
I have reasonable grounds to believe that you were driving or were in physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other
intoxicating substances. You are required by law to take one or more
evidentiary test(s) to determine the concentration of alcohol or presence of drugs
or other intoxicating substances in your body. After submitting to the test(s) you
may, when practical, at your own expense, have additional test(s) made by a
person of your own choosing. You do not have the right to talk to a lawyer before
taking any evidentiary test(s) to determine the alcohol concentration or presence
of drugs or other intoxicating substances in your body. [emphasis added].
The form goes on to list a litany of punishments that will result if a person refuses, including loss
of their driver's license and a fine. The obvious problem with this warning is that the law
requiring those tests is unconstitutional until the officer has secured a waITant or has a valid
exception to the warrant requirement. A state may not pass a law that visits penalties upon a
citizen for exercising a constitutional right. See Camara v. Municipal Court of the City And

County ofSan Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 531-534 (1967) (striking down laws that allow for fines
when individuals refuse to consent to waITantless searches of their dwellings); Columbia Basin

Apartment Association v. City o_f Pasco, 268 F.2d 791, 797-798 (9th.Cir.2001) (plaintiff tenants
have standing to challenge ordinance requiring tenants to allow waITantless searches of their
homes or face eviction); Wilson v. City of Cincinnati, 346 N.E.2d 666 (Ohio 1976) (striking
down ordinance requiring seller of a house to consent to a waITantless search or face a fine
between $5 and $500 because it coerced a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights). An officer may
not threaten to do what he is not legally or constitutionally authorized to do. Bumper v. North

Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548-550 (1968); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488-89 (2007). The
policeman's threat vitiates any consent. Id.

- 28 -

The United States Supreme Court ruled in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564
(1983), that a refusal was not being compelled because an officer could lawfully perform the
search. The Court relied on Schmerber to reach that conclusion:
In contrast to these prohibited choices, the values behind the Fifth Amendment are
not hindered when the state offers a suspect the choice of submitting to the bloodalcohol test or having his refusal used against him. The simple blood-alcohol test
is so safe, painless, and commonplace, that respondent concedes, as he must,
that the state could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede
to the test. Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly
legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a
second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making
that choice. Nor is this a case where the State has subtly coerced respondent into
choosing the option it had no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice.
To the contrary, the State wants respondent to choose to take the test, for the
inference of intoxication arising from a positive blood-alcohol test is far stronger
than that arising from a refusal to take the test

Id. at 563-64 citing Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (emphasis added). Naturally, this does not hold
true. The ruling in McNeely necessarily overruled this holding. An officer cannot lawfully force
a blood draw. He must seek a warrant or be able to point to exigent circumstances. Despite this
contradiction, the Supreme Court wrote in dicta in McNeely that the state could still rely on
implied consent and that refusals may be used against them because they do not violate the Fifth
Amendment, specifically citing Neville. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1566. This dicta does not
save Neville. Since the officer cannot warrantlessly force a evidentiary testing, the state is
coercing the respondent into choosing an option it has no right to compel.
Article I Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution affords greater protection than the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution based upon the long-standing jurisprudence of the
Idaho appellate courts, the uniqueness of the State of Idaho, and the uniqueness of the Idaho
Constitution. See State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 995 (1992) (not the exclusionary rule, but the
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constitutional provision itself impedes fact-finding function of Court- but this is a "price the
framers anticipated and were willing to pay"); State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746 (1988)
(Idahoans have a higher expectation of privacy in the home); State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387
(1981) (judicial integrity mandates exclusionary rule); State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586 (1978)
(admission of illegally seized evidence itself a violation of constitution); State v. Arregui, 44
Idaho 43 (1927) (application of exclusionary rule in Idaho 34 years prior to Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961)); State v. Cada, 129 Idaho 224 (Ct.App.1996) (Idahoans have higher expectation
of privacy in their land). Thus, the results of the breath test, because they were taken in violation
of Article I § 17, must be excluded at trial.
In this case, the defendant was read the ALS form without a warrant being secured.
Therefore, the consent given was invalid, and the results of the test should be suppressed. This
Court should reverse the denial of the Motion to Suppress the breath test and remand to allow the
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea.
CONCLUSION
The case before this Court requires it to determine how far the state may go in violating a
citizen's rights to prove a charge of Driving under the Influence. This Comi should reverse the
lower Court's denial of the Motion to Suppress the breath test, and/or the Motion in Limine, and
remand for further proceedings, including a requirement that the defendant be allowed to
withdraw his plea.
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